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 INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
 Amici are professors of law who research, write, and teach in the area 
of copyright, trademark, the right of publicity, and related fields.  Amici’s 
institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only, and 
imply no endorsement of the views expressed herein:  
Stacy L. Dogan, Boston University School of Law  
Eric Goldman, Santa Clara University School of Law 
Laura A. Heymann, William & Mary Law School 
Mark A. Lemley, Stanford Law School 
Yvette Joy Liebesman, St. Louis University School of Law 
Bill McGeveran, University of Minnesota School of Law 
Mark P. McKenna, Notre Dame Law School 
Tyler Ochoa, Santa Clara University School of Law 
Rebecca Tushnet, Georgetown Law   
Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of this case.1 Counsel for all 
parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amici hereby certify that no party’s 
counsel authored this brief in whole or in part; no party or party’s counsel 
contributed money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and no 
person other than amici contributed money intended to fund preparing or 
submitting the brief. 
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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
 Based on the undisputed facts, the NFL’s films in this case are 
noncommercial speech; their profit-seeking and brand-building nature are 
standard features of noncommercial speech.  Truthful, nondefamatory 
noncommercial speech deserves full First Amendment protection, and there 
is no justification for allowing Appellants to control speech about them in 
this case. 
Separately, Appellants’ right of publicity claims are preempted by the 
Copyright Act, which allows owners of copyrighted works to exploit those 
works by reproduction, distribution, creation of derivative works, and public 
performance—precisely the conduct at issue here. 
Finally, Appellants’ trademark claims are also precluded by the First 
Amendment, given that their appearance in the films at issue is relevant to 
the films’ subject matter and not explicitly misleading as to any possible 
endorsement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Films Are Noncommercial Speech. 
The District Court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the NFL 
2 
 
 films at issue are noncommercial speech. See United States v. United Foods, 
Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (defining “commercial speech” as “speech 
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction”). The fact that the 
films have a commercial purpose doesn’t change their constitutional status. 
The New York Times has a commercial purpose; so do video games, 
television programs, and films. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 
U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (holding that “expression by means of motion 
pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty” in the 
Constitution, even though filmmaking “is a large-scale business conducted 
for private profit”).2 The court’s discounting of commercial purpose was not 
factfinding. It was adherence to constitutional command.  
Nor does the NFL’s explicit acknowledgment that its content 
contributes value to the NFL brand make its speech commercial. The NFL 
also publishes traditional books, such as NFL Record & Fact Book 2014.3  
Readers’ ability to collect and review information about NFL teams 
2 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), 
labeled a television station’s speech as commercial because it was made for 
profit, 433 U.S. at 575–76, but subsequent cases clarified that non-
advertising speech made for profit is noncommercial for First Amendment 
purposes. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 
(1983) (holding that economic motivation for speech by itself does not make 
speech commercial). 
3 Retailing for $17.06 as of Jan. 25, 2015, http://www.amazon.com/Record-
Official-National-FootballLeague/dp/1618933949.  
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 undoubtedly increases attention to and affection for those teams, just as the 
film Seabiscuit brought more attention to a particular racehorse. But the 
books themselves are classic noncommercial speech: they are the content 
being sold, not ads for other products. So too with the NFL’s films. The 
audiences for these works are likely to be football fans, but that’s also true of 
the sports pages, broadcasts of NFL games, and biographies of Knute 
Rockne. All of these are plainly noncommercial speech. 
Noncommercial speakers routinely enhance their “brands” through the 
creation of attractive content that is itself noncommercial speech.4  
Politicians write books promoting themselves and their connections to other 
well-known figures such as Ronald Reagan.  The fact that the books are 
overwhelmingly positive and aid in fundraising doesn’t make them 
commercial. “J.K. Rowling” is a registered trademark, U.S. Reg. No. 
4,356,096, not to mention an incredible selling point for any book bearing 
her name.  That selling power doesn’t make Harry Potter commercial 
4 See, e.g., Sharon Waxman, BET to Make Feature Films, WASH. POST, Nov. 
13, 1998 (“The benefits for BET, even in a business as uncertain as movie 
production, is in accumulating a film library, creating movies for use on the 
three BET cable channels, and enhancing the company’s brand name ....”); 
Graham Taylor, A Footnote - Far from It: Publishers Are Key in Advancing 
Scholarship, TIMES HIGHER ED. SUPP., Oct. 13, 2011, at 28 (touting the 
importance of academic journal “brands”); Christine Dolen, Disney Acts Up, 
MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18, 1998, at 1I (statement from Disney executive that 
Lion King musical enhanced Disney’s brand). 
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 speech. Nor does the fact that sales of candy based on the Harry Potter 
series, Bertie Botts Every Flavor Beans, were driven by the success of Harry 
Potter make Harry Potter commercial speech. In short, a creator’s 
recognition that an attractive presentation of its content enhances the 
creator’s goodwill is completely standard for noncommercial speech. 
As the court below recognized, it is also significant that individual 
consumers, advertisers and television channels pay for the NFL’s content, 
rather than the NFL paying them to run it or sending it for free.  This is 
strong evidence of the noncommercial nature of the NFL’s films. Slip op. at 
14-15. Unlike the image advertising in Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 
743 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2014), the NFL films themselves have economic 
value to the NFL and to the films’ distributors and audiences, independent 
of some other product that could be separately purchased. Cf. Matthews v. 
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that defendant’s novel 
fell “within the protection of the First Amendment” whether it was “viewed 
as an historical or fictional work,” so long as it was “not simply a disguised 
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services”). No particular 
commercial message about what else to buy is “easily inferred” from the 
films, Jordan, 743 F.3d at 519; cf. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60 (1983) (finding pamphlets commercial where the manufacturer’s 
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 economic interest in disseminating them would only be served if consumers 
separately purchased contraceptives).5 
The District Court’s holding that the films were not advertisements in 
disguise also serves the important function of avoiding chilling effects on 
noncommercial speech that would inevitably result from mistakenly 
equating economic motivation with commerciality. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (noting that “news reporting, comment, 
criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research ... ‘are generally conducted for 
profit in this country’”) (citations omitted). 
II. The Right of Publicity Cannot Constitutionally Be Extended to the 
Films. 
 
Under ordinary First Amendment principles, the noncommercial NFL 
films cannot be restrained unless they are false or defamatory or fit within 
the narrow rule of Zacchini, which approved a right of publicity equivalent 
to infringement of common-law copyright. Neither justification exists here. 
A. The Films Are Not False or Defamatory. 
This Court has recognized “the public value of information about the 
5 While amici believe that Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d 
Cir. 2008), was wrongly decided, it may also be distinguished because no 
independent third party paid for the valuable rights to own a copy of or 
distribute the work in and of itself, as the program at issue there aired on the 
NFL Network. 
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 game of baseball and its players.” C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major 
League Baseball, 505 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2007). Given the NFL’s 
enormous popularity, information about professional football and its players 
has at least as much value. When an organization “lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance[,] then state officials may 
not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to 
further a state interest of the highest order.” Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) also  (emphasizing). Given the First Amendment 
value of truthful, nondefamatory speech, courts should not lightly give the 
subjects of such speech control over it.  Thus, the right of publicity must be 
carefully limited to avoid becoming a right to control public discourse.  Cf. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (refusing to allow 
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to evade the strict 
requirements of defamation as applied to editorial speech). 
In C.B.C., this Court held that the First Amendment interests of 
fantasy baseball game providers trumped professional baseball players’ 
rights of publicity. C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 823.6 Despite the fact that C.B.C.’s 
6 As C.B.C. recognized, and as Zacchini made clear, the question of whether 
the First Amendment trumps the plaintiff’s right of publicity is a question of 
federal Constitutional law, not one of state law. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 
568; C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 822-24 (distinguishing between the state law 
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 fantasy games were “for purposes of profit” and therefore “for commercial 
advantage,” use of the players “names, nicknames, likenesses, signatures, 
pictures, playing records, and/or biographical data of each player” was 
clearly expressive. Id. No more is required of truthful noncommercial 
speech. 
Amici believe that categorically distinguishing between commercial 
and noncommercial uses is generally the best way to implement C.B.C.’s 
balancing approach.  Truthful noncommercial speech warrants the highest 
protection, while celebrities’ economic interests in controlling truthful 
nonadvertising speech about them are much weaker than their interests in 
controlling advertising that invokes their identities to sell separate products.  
See id. at 824 (reasoning that celebrities can protect their economic interests 
by controlling sponsorships and blocking confusing commercial uses, and 
that any noneconomic interests in controlling truthful reporting about their 
performances do not justify suppressing truthful speech).  As the C.B.C. 
court reasoned, “the information used in [the NFL’s films] is all readily 
available in the public domain, and it would be strange law that a person 
would not have a first amendment right to use information that is available 
question of whether the defendant’s use was for commercial advantage and 
the question of whether the First Amendment trumps the right of publicity).  
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 to everyone.” Id. at 823.7  An approach that focuses on the commercial 
endorsement/noncommercial speech divide in striking the First Amendment 
balance avoids the chilling effects that would occur if the producer of 
truthful noncommercial speech had to anticipate a court’s judgment about 
the value of its particular speech or of a particular person’s personality 
rights, and comports with the categorically lower protection given to 
commercial speech.8 
B. Zacchini Provides No Warrant for Extending the Right of 
Publicity to the NFL’s Films. 
While Zacchini allows a “right of publicity” lawsuit in the context of 
noncommercial speech, it depends on circumstances not applicable here. The 
Supreme Court consistently characterized the conflict in Zacchini as one 
between the First Amendment and the use by the defendant of the plaintiff’s 
“entire act”—equivalent to a common-law copyright, not a conventional 
right of publicity claim. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.9  
7 Amici believe that C.B.C.’s reference to “the public domain” is best 
understood as a reference to the C.B.C. plaintiffs’ attempts to claim facts as 
their own property outside the context of false endorsement. 
8 See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: 
First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 
CAL. L. REV. 935, 942-43 (1968) (explaining the benefits of categorical 
balancing). 
9 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (“the State’s interest [in permitting a right of 
publicity] is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law”); id. 
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 The Court suggested that use of Zacchini’s entire act posed a 
“substantial threat to the economic value of that performance.” Id. But this 
concern was quite specific to broadcasting of the entire performance. 
Indeed, the Court emphasized that “the broadcast of [Zacchini’s] entire 
performance, unlike the unauthorized use of another’s name for purposes of 
trade or the incidental use of a name or picture by the press, goes to the heart 
of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an entertainer.” Id. at 576. Thus, 
according to the Court, “Ohio ha[d] recognized what may [have been] the 
strongest case for a ‘right of publicity’—involving, not the appropriation of 
an entertainer’s reputation to enhance the attractiveness of a commercial 
product, but the very activity by which the entertainer acquired his 
at 575 (“The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring 
respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television 
than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted 
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner.”); id. at 576 (“the 
same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by 
this Court”); 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 11:55 (“The proper category for Zacchini’s claim was the state 
law of common law copyright, not the right of publicity.”); Stacey L. Dogan 
& Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn From Trademark 
Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (2006) (same); Wendy J. Gordon, An 
Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, 
Consent and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365 n.97 
(1989) (same); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right 
of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. 35, 49-50 & n.43 (1998) 
(same); cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 
(Cal. 2001) (“Zacchini was not an ordinary right of publicity case: the 
defendant television station had appropriated the plaintiff’s entire act, a 
species of common law copyright violation.”). 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 reputation in the first place.” Id.  
This case does not involve anything like use of the Appellants’ “entire 
acts,” and it does not involve a performance in which Appellants could have 
a common-law copyright. The films at issue collectively show only a 
fraction of the plays in which Appellants were involved as players, and 
Appellants appear in only small portions of the films. As the District Court 
found, even in the film that features the most footage of any Appellant 
(Dryer),  
his name is not mentioned until more than 5 minutes into the film and 
is spoken only twice in the entire production. The only way a viewer 
would know that Dryer appears in the footage is if the viewer knows 
that Dryer wore number 89 for the Giants. He is not featured in the 
production .… Most of his appearances in the production are fleeting, 
for mere seconds at a time .… The production never focuses only on 
Dryer or his image; rather, he is always shown with his teammates in 
the context of a football play.  
 
Dryer, __ F.Supp.3d __, 2014 WL 5106738 at *5 (D. Minn., Oct. 10, 2014). 
The other Appellants appear even less prominently.10  
Appellants’ passing appearances in NFL Films also pose nothing like 
the economic threat of broadcasting Zacchini’s entire performance. Aside 
from the brevity of their appearances, Appellants were paid for their 
participation in the NFL games shown in the films. Id. at *10; see also 
C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824 (rejecting right of publicity claims by Major League 
10 Dryer, 2014 WL 510738 at *5-*6. 
11 
 
                                                 
 Baseball players and noting that the players “are rewarded, and handsomely, 
too, for their participation in games and can earn additional large sums from 
endorsements and sponsorship arrangements”). The films made by NFL 
Films had no negative impact on Appellants’ incentives to develop their 
football skills – if anything, Appellants benefited from NFL Films’ 
contribution to the popularity of the NFL.  
C. Categorical Protection for Noncommercial Speech Against 
Right of Publicity Claims is Superior to the Alternatives. 
 
Because Zacchini does not apply, the NFL cannot be subject to 
liability for noncommercial speech about a matter of public interest that is 
not false or defamatory. No other balancing is necessary. This bright-line 
approach avoids the chilling effects, unpredictability, and risks of mistake 
otherwise caused by ad hoc balancing, which would require courts to weigh 
incommensurable and unmeasurable free speech interests against a 
plaintiff’s inchoate interests in “controlling” his public presentation.  Cf. 
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment's 
guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that 
survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. The First 
Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our 
12 
 
 Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the 
basis that some speech is not worth it.”).11 
Amici believe that categorical protection for truthful noncommercial 
speech is superior to alternate approaches that require courts to take on the 
role of art critics, judging where the “value” in a work comes from. See 
Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) 
(adopting “transformativeness” test); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W. 3d 
363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (asking whether the “predominant purpose” of the use 
“is to make an expressive comment on or about a celebrity,” or whether 
instead the use “predominantly exploits the commercial value of an 
individual’s identity”). The transformativeness test is derived from copyright 
law, but, unlike in a copyright case, there is no specific prior work that might 
be examined in a right of publicity case to see if the defendant’s use adds 
new meaning, message, or purpose.  As a result, transformativeness, like the 
predominant purpose inquiry, inevitably degenerates into an ad hoc 
evaluation of the artistic merits of the defendant’s use, with unpredictable 
11 See also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 479 (“Most of what we say to one another 
lacks ‘religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or 
artistic value’ (let alone serious value), but it is still sheltered from 
government regulation.”). 
13 
 
                                                 
 and speech-chilling results.12  Under the proper approach, a nondefamatory 
docudrama would be protected by the First Amendment even if it was a 
workmanlike retelling of the plaintiff’s story,13 and even if the plaintiff had 
licensed other docudramas in the past.  This rule avoids discrimination based 
on the artistic merit of the speech or the person depicted, so long as the 
speech is noncommercial. 
III. Separately, Copyright Preemption Precludes the Right of Publicity 
Claim. 
The Court should recognize the serious copyright conflicts involved in 
extending publicity rights to noncommercial speech.  The right of publicity 
potentially conflicts with a copyright owner’s right to exploit its copyright. 
See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 
1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc); Wendt v. Host 
Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
12 See Rebecca Tushnet, A Mask that Eats into the Face: Images and the 
Right of Publicity, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157, 170-78 (2015); cf. ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Pub’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (majority and 
dissent disagreed about value of what painter-defendant contributed to 
painting); Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003) (reversing court of 
appeals’ finding of nontransformativeness). 
13 The transformative use test is constitutionally perverse in that it makes 
First Amendment protection afforded to a work inversely correlated with 
accuracy.  If the test were taken seriously, the works least likely to enjoy 
immunity would be biographies and documentary films – works at the First 
Amendment’s core, where the relevance of the use is most obvious.   
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 from denial of reh’g en banc). Conflict preemption occurs when a state law 
obstructs a federal statute’s aims, and can operate in tandem with an explicit 
preemption provision such as 17 U.S.C. § 301. See Geier v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000). 
Conflict preemption is often appropriate where state rights are 
asserted in the context of works that fall within the general scope of 
copyright or patent law, regardless of whether the material claimed would be 
copyrightable or patentable. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225, 231–32 (1964) (“To allow a State by use of its law of unfair 
competition to prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight 
an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the 
public something which federal law has said belongs to the public.”); 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964) 
(same). 
As the Supreme Court explained, states can pursue consumer 
protection objectives, but they cannot seek to encourage production directly 
by granting monopoly rights over federally unprotected subject matter. 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 
(1989);  see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) 
(finding no conflict between state trade secret law and patent law where the 
15 
 
 type of conduct targeted was substantially different, even if trade secret 
protection also had incentive effects). As C.B.C. indicates, to the extent that 
the right of publicity protects consumers from misleading commercial 
advertising, it poses no conflict with copyright law.  But equally, to the 
extent that a state’s right of publicity exists to protect against false 
endorsement, it should be subject to the same First Amendment constraints 
as Lanham Act false endorsement claims.  See infra Part IV.  Moreover, to 
the extent that a state’s right of publicity exists to protect dignitary interests, 
it should not be allowed to evade First Amendment constraints on dignity 
torts: primarily falsity and actual malice.  See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50; supra, 
Part I.A. 
The remaining justification offered for the right of publicity in the 
context of the exploitation of creative works depicting public events is 
fundamentally the same as that of the copyright law: to incentivize 
production of creative performances. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he 
protection [afforded by a right to control broadcast of an entire act] provides 
an economic incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required 
to produce a performance of interest to the public. This same consideration 
underlies the patent and copyright laws.”); see also Laws, 448 F.3d at 1145 
(recognizing the similarity); C.B.C., 505 F.3d at 824 (publicity rights are 
16 
 
 intended “to provide incentives to encourage a person’s productive activities 
and to protect consumers from misleading advertising”). The efficacy or lack 
thereof of this proposed incentive is irrelevant, because providing incentives 
of this sort is a power reserved to the federal government. In this way, the 
right of publicity differs from other, nonpreempted causes of action such as 
defamation and invasion of privacy.   
Furthermore, the fact that the right of publicity approved in Zacchini 
was functionally a common-law copyright in a performance that was not 
fixed with the author’s consent, see supra note 9 and accompanying text, has 
relevance both for the First Amendment analysis and for the preemption 
analysis. After Zacchini, Congress preempted common-law copyrights for 
fixed works. See Lapham v. Porach, 2007 WL 1224924 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 
2007).14   
Professor Jennifer Rothman has provided the most comprehensive 
examination of conflict preemption beyond § 301, and applying her analysis 
reveals that conflict preemption is appropriate here because Appellants 
14 Zacchini was decided in 1977, before the current Copyright Act became 
effective (Jan. 1, 1978). The 1976 Copyright Act, unlike its predecessors, 
protects expressive works as soon they are fixed in a tangible medium, not 
when they are published; state common-law copyright is preempted except 
insofar as it covers unfixed works.  Zacchini’s claim, founded on a live 
performance that wasn’t fixed with his consent, would still be outside the 
scope of the modern Copyright Act, but fixed creative works are now the 
exclusive realm of federal copyright law. 
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 consented to their appearance in copyrighted works. See Jennifer E. 
Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 199 (2002) (arguing that conflict preemption should preclude a right 
of publicity claim when the publicity right holder consented to the original 
work and the use does not infringe copyright).15  
By playing in football games with the certain knowledge that they 
were being filmed by NFL Films, Appellants consented to the creation of 
copyrighted works—films of football games—embodying their 
contributions. Dryer, 2014 WL 5106738 at *15-16; see Baltimore Orioles, 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Association, 805 F.2d 663, 675–76 & 
n.22 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding preemption in similar circumstances). Their 
consent need not be valid for purposes of applying state publicity law, 
because the issue is whether there was consent for federal copyright 
purposes: consent to appear in the copyrighted video in which their 
appearances were fixed. Appellants’ appearances fall outside of the realm of 
unfixed performances, and thus of unpreempted common-law copyright—
regardless of whether Appellants count as “authors” for purposes of 
15 See also Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of 
Publicity with First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165 (2010) (arguing for conflict preemption of right of 
publicity claims in cases involving noncommercial speech, absent specific 
exceptions). 
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 copyright’s authorship requirement. Cf. National Basketball Assoc. v. 
Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that “Congress 
specifically had sporting events in mind” when it drafted the fixation 
provision and finding that fixation merged the performance with the fixed 
work for preemption purposes).16 
Conflict preemption also explains and harmonizes most of the results 
in the case law. For example, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 
preemption analysis ought to differ between uses to advertise something else 
and use of a work itself. See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 
1141 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][l] (rev. ed. 2013) (surveying 
relevant case law and finding a general divide between uses that are simply 
exploitations of the copyrighted work and uses of the copyrighted work to 
sell some other product). Unlike in other voice imitation cases finding no 
preemption, the plaintiff in Laws had consented to the fixation of her voice 
in the recording used by defendants.17 The owner of the copyright in the 
16 Appellants could limit the scope of their consent by contract, and contract 
claims would not be preempted, but Appellants do not here bring contract 
claims.  
17 The use the Laws plaintiff sued over also involved the use of her name, id. 
at 1143. Laws allowed the use of the performer’s name to accurately identify 
her where copyright preemption prevented a claim based on her performance 
itself. 
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 sound recording could reasonably expect that the performer wouldn’t 
interfere with the copyright owner’s exercise of rights, absent some 
contractual reservation, and thus her claim was preempted. The Ninth 
Circuit also found preemption when a movie actor alleged that his name and 
likeness appeared in counterfeit films, because “the essence of [the actor]’s 
claim is that the . . . defendants reproduced and distributed the [films] 
without authorization,” not that the original copyrighted film had been made 
without the actor’s knowing participation. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 
144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Likewise, a California court found right of publicity claims by 
performers in a film preempted when their complaint was that the film was 
released without their consent (because they hadn’t been paid). Fleet v. CBS, 
Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see also Maloney v. 
T3Media, Inc., No. 14-cv-05048 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015), slip op. at 9 
(“Accepting Plaintiffs’ interpretation [that the right of publicity extended to 
sale and distribution of photos of athletes] without separating the likeness 
from the work would impermissibly negate Copyright’s intended preemptive 
effect. Further, it would destroy copyright holders’ ability to exercise their 
exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, effectively giving the subject of 
every photograph veto power over the artist’s rights under the Copyright Act 
20 
 
 and destroying the exclusivity of rights the Copyright Act aims to protect.”); 
Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C13-1932, 2014 WL 1411849 
(W.D. Wash. 2014) (finding § 301 preemption of right of publicity claim 
based on reproduction of photos showing plaintiffs’ children); Ray v. ESPN, 
Inc., No. 13-1179-CV, 2014 WL 2766187, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014) 
(finding preemption where defendant “air[ed] video recordings depicting 
[plaintiff] in a ‘work of authorship,’ which is plainly encompassed by 
copyright law”).  
Professor McCarthy has also advocated using § 301 preemption to 
make an advertising/nonadvertising distinction. 2 MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF 
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 11:55, at 817 (2d ed. 2014) (suggesting that 
preemption is appropriate when a defendant “reproduces a recorded 
performance in an expressive, non-advertising medium”).18 The Third 
18 Courts rejecting § 301 preemption reason that regulation of the celebrity 
identity captured in an image is not the same as regulation of the copyright-
protected image itself. However, the fact that a persona is not copyrightable 
does not end the inquiry even under § 301. Congress intended to preclude 
states from giving copyright-like protection to matter within the general 
scope of copyright even if that matter was not copyrightable. See, e.g., 
Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (“[T]he scope of the subject matter of copyright law is broader 
than the protection it affords.... For preemption purposes, ideas and concepts 
that are fixed in a tangible medium fall within the scope of copyright . . . 
despite the exclusion of fixed ideas from the scope of actual federal 
copyright protection.”); Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 at 849 (state protection for 
uncopyrightable facts such as basketball scores was preempted); Toney v. 
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 Circuit also endorsed a commercial advertising/ordinary exploitation 
distinction. Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1029 (“The rationale is that state law has a 
role in regulating practices of trade, including advertising. But limiting the 
way that material can be used in expressive works extends beyond the 
purview of state law and into the domain of copyright law.”). 
The key issue is that allowing performers to control ordinary, non-
advertising exploitation of a copyright would interfere too much with 
copyright owners’ rights, and allowing them to control commercial 
endorsements does not. To put it another way, the right of publicity’s core 
function is to control uses in commercial advertising for separate products; 
copyright’s core function is not. This is conflict preemption.19  
At a minimum, to the extent that the “subject matter” and “extra 
element” inquiries of § 301 are ambiguous, conflict preemption 
L'Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 910-11 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[S]tate laws that 
intrude on the domain of copyright are preempted even if the particular 
expression is neither copyrighted nor copyrightable.”).  
19 Cf. Laws, 448 F.3d at 1145 (“We sense that, left to creative legal 
arguments, the developing right of publicity could easily supplant the 
copyright scheme. This, Congress has expressly precluded in § 301. Were 
we to conclude that [plaintiff’s] voice misappropriation claim was not 
preempted by the Copyright Act, then virtually every use of a copyrighted 
sound recording would infringe upon the original performer’s right of 
publicity . . . . It is hard to imagine how a copyright would remain 
meaningful if its licensees were potentially subject to suit from any 
performer anytime the copyrighted material was used.”).  
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 considerations favor reading them to preempt right of publicity claims 
against nonadvertising uses of copyrighted works. 
IV. Rogers Properly Bars Appellants’ Lanham Act Claims.  
Courts in the Lanham Act context have confronted a very similar 
conflict between the First Amendment and false endorsement claims by 
people portrayed in expressive works. And consensus has been building 
around a strongly speech-protective standard for nonadvertising speech. 
Under this approach, most prominently associated with Rogers v. Grimaldi, 
875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989), use of a mark in an expressive work is 
insulated from liability unless the use has “no artistic relevance to the 
underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the 
[use] explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Id. at 
999.20 Some differences in application of the Rogers test persist, but most 
courts confronting cases involving expressive works in recent years have 
accepted the basic approach.21 
20 While Rogers itself involved use of a mark (a celebrity’s name) in the title 
of a work, more recent cases have made clear that the same test applies to 
use within the work itself. See, e.g., Brown v. Electronic Arts, 724 F.3d 1235 
(9th Cir. 2013); University of Alabama Board of Trustees v. New Life Art, 
Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2012); E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, 
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008); ETW Corp. v. 
Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).   
21 See, e.g., Moore v. Weinstein Co., 545 Fed.Appx. 405 (6th Cir. 2013) 
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 The Rogers test appropriately tracks the two First Amendment 
considerations relevant in right of publicity cases: the focus on artistic 
relevance asks whether the use is related to noncommercial speech, or is 
merely a disguised advertisement for an unrelated product. And the question 
of whether the use is explicitly misleading relates to falsity; the explicitness 
requirement provides insurance against potentially speech-suppressive 
mistakes.22 Use of Rogers in the Lanham Act context therefore aligns with 
the approach to right of publicity cases we have outlined above, which, 
outside the common-law copyright situation of Zacchini, asks explicitly 
whether the speech is noncommercial and whether it is false or defamatory.  
This alignment is important because it makes little sense to apply 
(applying Rogers to state-law trademark claims based on use of nickname 
and life story in film); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 
2003) (adopting Rogers in the context of song titles); Louis Vuitton 
Malletier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 174-75 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding defendant’s depiction of a character in the film The 
Hangover II carrying a knockoff Louis Vuitton bag and mispronouncing the 
brand name protected under Rogers); Winchester Mystery House, LLC v. 
Global Asylum, 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Ct. App. 2012) (adopting Rogers for 
analyzing uses of landmark as portrayed in film); Montgomery v. 
Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524 (Ky. 2001) (adopting Rogers for use of image, 
voice, and name of musician in music video about him). See also Daniel 
Jacob Wright, Explicitly Explicit: The Rogers Test and the Ninth Circuit, 21 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 193, 203 (2013) (noting widespread adoption of Rogers). 
22 Of particular note, unless an expressive work explicitly claims to be “the 
authorized story,” it is unlikely to be material to audiences whether a person 
portrayed therein consented to be portrayed. The usual consumer protection 
rationale for Lanham Act protection is therefore minimized with expressive 
works. See Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 48-49 (1989).   
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 different tests to Lanham Act and right of publicity claims.23 Plaintiffs 
commonly assert both claims on the same facts, as the plaintiffs did here. 
Indeed, Rogers involved both Lanham Act and right of publicity claims, and 
the Second Circuit framed the inquiry regarding the right of publicity in 
nearly identical terms, immunizing “use of a celebrity’s name in a movie 
title unless the title was ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply a 
disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’” 
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.24  
Using the same approach to resolve the First Amendment conflict in 
both contexts promotes uniformity and avoids the obvious incentive to avoid 
constitutional limits merely by repleading.  
CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
23 Compare Brown, 724 F.3d at 1242-47 (finding video game protected by 
First Amendment against false endorsement claim based solely on use of 
plaintiffs’ image and biographical data) with Keller v. Elec. Arts (In re 
NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.), 724 F.3d 1268 
(9th Cir. 2013) (finding video game unprotected by First Amendment 
against right of publicity claim based on same conduct). 
24 The Second Circuit applied this limit as a matter of Oregon law, as it 
expected New York would apply that law. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. For 
reasons previously explained, we believe the First Amendment requires such 
limitations whether or not state law imposes them.  
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